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Introduction 
 
Sustained, high levels of unemployment in the majority of Europe's largest economies have led 
many Europeans to look to the United States as a possible alternative economic model. The political 
right and center in Europe have emphasized what they see as the flexibility and dynamism of the 
U.S. economy. Much of the left, meanwhile, have argued that high unemployment in Europe, which 
is often concentrated in specific geographic regions or demographic groups, is the driving force 
behind "social exclusion" in Europe today. This has led many Europeans – even some in the 
continent’s social democratic parties – to the reluctant conclusion that the United States may be a 
good model for reducing social exclusion there. 
 
This paper reviews several international indicators of social exclusion to assess how well the United 
States has done in using its apparently greater flexibility and dynamism to reduce social exclusion. 
On most measures of inequality, poverty, health, education, crime, and punishment, the United 
States does not fare well compared to the much-better-funded welfare states in Europe. The gap 
between U.S. and European performance in many of these dimensions is striking, and not fully 
acknowledged in the current debate around promoting U.S.-style reforms in Europe. What is more 
surprising, however, is that the United States, in fact, performs poorly in two areas where U.S. 
superiority is usually simply taken for granted: incorporating traditionally disadvantaged groups into 




We start with what is probably the most basic indicator of social exclusion – household income 
inequality. Table 1 presents data on income inequality for 28 OECD countries in various years 
during the 1990s and the year 2000 from Smeeding (2004). (All tables appear at the end of this 
paper.) The final column of the table, which reports data on the Gini coefficient
1, the most 
common measure of income inequality, shows that the United States (0.37) had the second highest 
Gini coefficient among the countries with available data – only Mexico (0.49) had higher income 
inequality by this measure. The United Kingdom (0.35) was the European country with the next 
highest level of income inequality, followed by Ireland and Italy (both 0.33), with most of the 
remaining countries in Europe below 0.30. The countries with the lowest Gini coefficients were 
Denmark (0.24), Belgium (0.25), Finland (0.25), Germany (0.25), the Netherlands (0.25), Norway 
(0.25), and Sweden (0.25).
2
 
Another basic measure of income inequality is the distance between the 10th, the 50th, and the 90th 
percentiles of the national income distribution. The greater the distance between points in the distri- 
                                                 
1 The Gini coefficient varies from zero to one. A Gini coefficient of zero would indicate perfectly equal distribution of 
income across all households; a Gini coefficient of one indicates that all income is concentrated in one household. 
2  The Gini coefficients in the text are calculated using net disposable income, which subtracts taxes and includes 
transfer benefits. When measured using pre-tax income, the United States is not such an outlier. Using pre-tax income 
the Gini coefficient in the United States (0.45) lies well within the European range of market income inequality (0.39 to 
0.50). Progressive taxes and especially benefits and transfer payments dramatically reduce inequality in most European 
nations, with only relatively modest effects in the United States. 
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What is Social Exclusion? 
 
The term social exclusion has had a prominent place in the European debate on social 
problems and policies. The term grew out of a desire to encourage a richer discussion of
economic and social inequality and deprivation, which had traditionally focused on
income-based measures of inequality and poverty. 
 
The British government, which has established a Social Exclusion Unit, states that social
exclusion is "...about more than income poverty. Social exclusion happens when people or
places suffer from a series of problems such as unemployment, discrimination, poor skills, 
low incomes, poor housing, high crime,  ill health and family breakdown. When such 
problems combine they can create a vicious cycle." 
(http://www.socialexclusionunit.gov.uk/page.asp?id=213) 
 
According to Ruggeri Laderchi, Saith, and Stewart (2003): "The first use of the term
[social exclusion] has been attributed to Lenoir, French Secretary of State for Social
Action in Government in 1974, referring to people who did not fit into the norms of 
industrial societies, were not protected by social insurance, and were considered social
misfits." (p. 21) The term grew to encompass "...processes of marginalisation and
deprivation which can arise even within rich countries with comprehensive welfare 
provisions." (p. 21) Today, they note, "[t]he concept now forms a central aspect of



























bution, the greater the overall inequality. The first column of Table 1 demonstrate that, in the United 
States, the 10th percentile household earned about 39 percent of what the median household earned, 
while the 90th percentile household (see column two) earned about 210 percent of the median. The 
10th percentile earner in the United States was further below the median than was the case in every 
other country in the table except Mexico (28 percent).  In every European country except Italy (44), 
Ireland (46), and the United Kingdom (47), the 10th percentile household made at least 50 percent 
of median earnings. Among the major OECD economies, 10th percentile households fared best in 
Norway (57), Sweden (57), and the Netherlands (56).  
 
Meanwhile, the 90th percentile household in the United States (210) was further above the median 
than in almost every other country in the table. Only Mexico (328), Luxembourg (215), and the 
United Kingdom (215) had larger gaps between the 90th percentile and the median. Incomes at the 
top were closest to the median in Denmark (155), Slovakia (162), Finland (164) , and the 
Netherlands (167). 
 
The third column in the table calculates the ratio of the 90th and 10th percentile earnings, as an 
additional measure of income inequality (see Figure 1). Mexico (11.55) had, by far, the highest 
inequality using this simple gauge of inequality. The United States (5.45) was next, well ahead of the 
United Kingdom (4.58), Australia (4.33), and Canada (4.13). The countries with the lowest "90-10" 
gap were Norway (2.80), Denmark (2.85), Slovakia (2.88), Finland (2.90), and the Netherlands (2.98).  
 
 Is the U.S. a Good Model for Reducing Social Exclusion in Europe?    3 




















































Source: Smeeding (2004) 
 
By most measures, the United States is the most unequal of the major OECD countries, with a 
higher Gini coefficient, lower relative incomes at the 10th percentile, and a bigger gap between the 
incomes of rich and poor households than in any of the countries in Western Europe. Whatever 
capacity the United States might have for using its labor-market flexibility and dynamism to create 
jobs and channel potential workers into employment (which we examine below), this capacity has 
not avoided the emergence of substantial levels of income inequality with the resulting potential for 




Income inequality is, in and of itself, a cause for social concern,
3 but poverty – extreme relative or 
absolute deprivation – is generally seen as a more important indicator of potential social exclusion. 
As Townsend (1979) argues: those in poverty have “resources... so seriously below those 
commanded by the average family or individual that they are in effect excluded from ordinary living 
patterns, customs and activities.”
4
 
Table 2 presents data from Scruggs and Allan (2005) on relative and absolute measures of poverty 
at different points in time over the years 1990 to 2000 for a subset of the countries in the earlier 
figures on income inequality. The first column of Table 2 contains data on the relative poverty rate, 
defined as the share of the population in households with incomes below 40 percent of the median 
(which is obviously closely related to income inequality). Consistent with the earlier results for 
income inequality, the United States (10.7 percent) had the highest rate of relative poverty, followed  
                                                 
3 See, for example, Navarro (2002), for a discussion of the health and other impacts of inequality. 
4 Townsend (1979), p. 31. 
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Source: Scruggs and Allan (2005) 
 
by Ireland (8.0) and Italy (7.3). Relative poverty was lowest in Finland (2.1), Norway (2.8), Belgium 
(3.2), France (3.3), and Sweden (3.6). 
 
With respect to absolute poverty (see column two of Table 2 and Figure 2), defined here as earning 
at least 40 percent of the inflation-adjusted 1986 median income in the United States (converted to 
local currencies using purchasing power parity exchange rates), the United States, which has a much 
higher GDP per capita than most of the other countries in the sample,
5 does substantially better. 
About 8.7 percent of the U.S. population was living in poverty by these criteria, well below rates in 
Italy (18.8), Australia (16.4), Ireland (15.4), and the United Kingdom (11.8). The United States also 
does somewhat better than France (10.0). The rest of the European countries in the table, however, 
have lower absolute poverty rates, despite also having income levels that are 70 to 80 percent of U.S. 
levels. Norway (which has a GDP per person close to that of the United States) had an absolute 





Education is arguably the single most important tool available to combat social exclusion.  Table 3 
shows the educational attainment rates, standardized by the OECD, for our sample of OECD 
countries for 2003. The first two columns examine the share of the adult population with at least an 
upper-secondary education (roughly the equivalent of a high-school degree in the United States). 
The first column gives the figures for all adults age 25 to 64. The United States had the highest share 
of high-school-equivalent graduates, with 88 percent. Norway (87) and Slovakia (87) trailed close 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board, Total Economy Database, 
May 2006, http://www.ggdc.net/. 
6 Smeeding (2006) defines poverty as half of national median income and finds the pattern of poverty remains largely 
the same in the analysis by Scruggs and Allan (2005). 
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behind. In most of the rest of Western Europe between 60 and 80 percent of 25-to-64 year olds had 
completed the equivalent of high school. The biggest exceptions in Europe were Portugal (23), 
Spain (43), Italy (44), and Greece (51).  
 
European countries do considerably better, however, when we focus on just 25-to-34 year olds (see 
the second column of Table 3). High-school completion rates for this younger group are generally 
much higher than for the full 25-to-64 year olds, while rates are almost identical across the two age 
ranges in the United States (87-88 percent). Nevertheless, the United States generally still does better 
than European countries do. The exceptions are Finland (89), Sweden (91), Czech Republic (92), 
Slovakia (94), and Norway (95); while Austria (85), Germany (85), and Denmark (86) do not lag far 
behind the United States. 
 
The last two columns of the same table show the share of the adult population with roughly the 
equivalent of a four-year college degree or more. Once again, the United States, with 38 percent of 
25-to-64 year olds with college degrees (see column three), does well compared to Western Europe. 
Only Denmark (31), Norway (31), and Sweden (33) have at least 30 percent of their adult 
populations with college degrees. Most Western European countries fall in the 20-30 percent range, 
with several in the teens. 
 
When we look just at 25-to-34 year olds (see column four), many European countries do almost as 
well or better than the United States (39 percent) with respect to college graduates: Denmark (35), 
France (37), Ireland (37), Spain (38), Belgium (39), Finland (40), Norway (40), and Sweden (40). 
Several Western European countries, however, still lag far behind the United States: Italy (12), 
Austria (15), Portugal (16), Germany (22), and Greece (24).  
 
Attainment rates are only one way to measure the potential for educational outcomes to contribute 
to social exclusion. Table 4 presents results tabulated by the OECD from an international 
standardized test of mathematics administered to 15-year-olds. In Western Europe, only Greece 
(445), Italy (466), and Portugal (466) scored, on average, lower than the United States (483) (see 
Figure 10). Switzerland (527), Belgium (529), the Netherlands (538), and Finland (544) did the best 
in Western Europe (see Figure 3).  
 
For purposes of social exclusion, however, we may be particularly interested in the scores of the 
poorest-performing students. The first column of Table 4, therefore, also shows the 10th percentile 
test scores in each country. In Western Europe, only Greece (324), Italy (342), and Portugal (352) 
scored lower than the United States (356). The best performers in Western Europe with respect to 
students at the 10th percentile were Ireland (393), Denmark (396), Iceland (396), Switzerland (396), 
Netherlands (415), and Finland (438). (For completeness, the last column in the table displays the 
results at the 90th percentile.) 
 
Table 5 demonstrates that the United States does poorly at both the mean and the 10th percentile
7 
despite spending substantially more on education at the primary ($8,049 per student) and secondary 
($9,098) level than almost every other country in the OECD. Only Luxembourg spends more at 
both levels ($10,611 for primary and $15,195 for secondary), and Norway more at the secondary-
school level ($10,154). (The data in the next-to-last column demonstrate that at the tertiary level, the 
United States does spend substantially more per student per year ($20,545) than all other European 
countries except Switzerland ($23,714). These expenditures, of course, have no direct impact on test  
                                                 
7 The relative performance of the United States is only marginally better at the 90th percentile, as Table 4 also shows. 
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scores of 15-year-olds.) As Table 6 makes clear, the vast majority of these expenditures at the 
primary and secondary level in the United States are in public schools (3.8 percentage points of U.S. 





The United States spends much more on health care than any other country in our sample. Table 7 
lists total expenditures on health care in 2003, separately for the public and private sectors, based on 
calculations by the OECD.  The first three columns express expenditures as a share of national 
GDP. The United States spent 15.0 percent of its GDP on health care in 2003 (see Figure 4). The 
next closest countries were Switzerland (11.5) and Germany (11.1); only three other countries spent 
more than ten percent (Iceland, 10.5; Norway, 10.3; and France, 10.1). Since U.S. GDP per capita is 
substantially higher than most of the countries in our sample, the gap between U.S. expenditures and 
those in other countries are even greater when we express health-care costs in terms of expenditures 
per person per year, which we do in the last three columns of the table. On average, the United 
States spends about $5,635 on health care per person per year. Of the remaining countries, only four 
others spend more than $3,000 per person per year: Norway ($3,807), Switzerland ($3,781), 
Luxembourg ($3,705), and Canada ($3,001). 
                                                 
8 In the United States, private educational expenditures are more important at the tertiary level, where the country 
spends about 1.2 percentage points of GDP on public higher education and 1.4 percentage points on private higher 
education. 
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Table 7 also breaks down health-care expenditures by whether they are in the public or private 
sector. The United States is the only country, except Mexico, in which expenditures in the private 
sector (8.3 percent of GDP) exceed those in the public sector (6.7). Greece and Switzerland are the 
only other countries where private-sector health expenditures exceed 40 percent of the total.  Even 
though private expenditures represent the bulk of health expenditures in the United States, public-
sector health costs in the United States still fall in about the middle of the range for public 
expenditures in Western European countries. Denmark (7.5), France (7.7), Sweden (8.0), Norway 
(8.6), and Germany (8.7) spend more in their public sectors, but Austria (5.1), Finland (5.7), Greece 
(5.1), Ireland (5.8), Italy (6.3), the Netherlands (6.1), Portugal (6.7), Spain (5.5), Switzerland (6.7), and 
the United Kingdom (6.4) all spend the same or less than the United States does.  
 
The data in Table 7 establish that the United States spends considerably more on health care than 
other rich countries do, but other data suggest that the United States nevertheless suffers from high 
levels of social exclusion with respect to health care. The most obvious element of this exclusion is 
the high share of the U.S. population without health insurance. The United States and Mexico are 
the only countries in Table 7 that do not provide essentially universal health-care coverage.  In 2003, 
15.6 percent of the U.S. population (about 45 million people or roughly the population of Spain) 
was without any form of health insurance, public or private, throughout the entire year.
9 An 




                                                 
9 See Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor, and Robert J. Mills, “Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance 
Coverage in the United States: 2003,” Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau (August 2004),  p. 14. 
10 The data refer to 2002, from Boushey (2004). 
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Data on many of the most common health indicators also suggest that the U.S. health-care system is 
highly inefficient, yielding poor outcomes despite high levels of expenditures. Table 8 provides 
details on several broad measures of health outcomes compiled by the OECD. Only Mexico and the 
transition economies of Eastern Europe have a lower overall life expectancy than the United States 
(77.2 years, identical to Denmark, see column three of Table 8 and Figure 5.) On average, residents 
of Spain (80.5), Switzerland (80.4), and Sweden (80.2) – the three countries with the longest life 
expectancies in our sample – live three full years longer than residents of the United States. Among 
the major OECD economies, the United States also has the highest rate of infant mortality (7.0 per 
1,000 live births, see column four). The next-highest rate in Western Europe is in the United 
Kingdom (5.3), while Norway (3.4), Finland (3.1), and Sweden (3.1) have rates that are less than half 
of those in the United States. The United States also fares poorly with respect to maternal mortality 
(see column five). At the turn of the century, the United States had 9.1 maternal deaths per 100,000 
births, the fourth- highest rate in the table behind Mexico (70.7), Denmark (11.1), and Luxembourg 
(10.9).
11 As with infant mortality, many Western European countries had maternal mortality rates 
that were less than half those in the United States: Ireland (3.1), Italy (3.1), Austria (3.6), Greece 
(3.9),  Spain (4.2), Sweden (4.2), and Germany (4.3). 
 
The United States also has a much higher share of its population that exceeds the medical standard 
of obesity (a body mass index, BMI, of 30 or greater). Just over 30 percent of adults in the United 
States are obese, compared to 23.0 percent in the United Kingdom, the Western European country 
with the highest rate of obesity; meanwhile, Switzerland (7.7), Norway (8.3), Italy (8.5), Austria (9.1), 
France (9.4), Denmark (9.5), and Sweden (9.7) all have obesity rates below ten percent. 
 
                                                 
11 Since only a very small share of women die in childbirth, the data for maternal mortality, which are typically presented 
per 100,000 births, can vary substantially from year to year. As a result, Table 8 presents maternal mortality data 
averaged over the five most recent (available) years. For small countries with few births per year, even a small number 
of relatively bad years can have a relatively long-lasting impact on maternal mortality rates. 
 Is the U.S. a Good Model for Reducing Social Exclusion in Europe?    9 
Public-health campaigns against smoking, however, have apparently been much more successful in 
the United States than they have been in most of Europe. Only 17.5 percent of U.S. adults smoke 
cigarettes daily (see the last column of Table 8). In Western Europe, only Sweden (17.5) has a rate as 
low. Most of Western Europe has smoking rates around 25 percent, with rates above 30 percent in 
the Netherlands (32.0), Greece (35.0), and Austria (36.3). 
 
The United States spends markedly more on health care (as a share of GDP or in dollars on a per 
person basis) than any other country in the world. Yet, more than 15 percent of its population 
typically finds itself without health coverage – private or public – throughout the entire length of any 
given year, with 27 percent lacking coverage at some point during the year. The additional U.S. 
expenditures on health care are also associated with substantially worse outcomes for basic health 
indicators including life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality, and obesity. The United States, 
however, has succeeded in lowering rates of adult smoking to the lowest level among the rich, 
industrialized countries. 
 
Crime and Punishment 
 
Another potential dimension of social exclusion is crime. Table 9 summarizes some basic indicators 
of both the prevalence of criminal activity, as well as the associated incarceration rates. 
 
The most reliable crime data are for murders, since murders are generally reported and accurately 
recorded. The first column of the table gives the murder rate for our list of countries, based on data 
compiled by the UK Home Office. The United States, at 5.6 murders per 100,000 people, has by far 
the highest murder rate in the sample of countries in the table. Finland (2.9) is next, followed by 
Slovakia (2.6), the Czech Republic (2.5), and New Zealand (2.5). The U.S. murder rate is about five 
times higher than the rate in the safest Western European countries: Austria (1.2), Germany (1.2), 
Portugal (1.2), Spain (1.1), Sweden (1.1), Switzerland (1.1), and Denmark (1.0). 
 
The United States does substantially better with respect to self-reported victimization rates, falling 
near but not at the top of the countries in Table 9. The second column of the table shows criminal 
victimization rates, expressed as reported offences per 100 people, from the 2000 International 
Crime Victims Survey.
12 In Western Europe, Switzerland (42.6 per 100 per year), Sweden (45.6), the 
Netherlands (48.1), and the United Kingdom (54.5) had higher victimization rates than the United 
States (39.5), while Denmark (35.1), France (33.9), Belgium (33.3), Austria (31.4), Finland (28.6), and 
Portugal (25.8) were all below the U.S. rate. 
 
Given that the United States has high, but not the highest overall, victimization rates, all else 
constant, we might expect the United States to fall somewhere near the top, but not at the top of the 
sample of countries when it comes to the portion of its population that is incarcerated. The last two 
columns of Table 9, which report prison-population rates from the International Center for Prison 
Studies, demonstrate however, that the United States has a prison-population rate (724 per 100,000) 
that is five to ten times higher than rates in Western Europe, where incarceration rates range from 
68 in Norway to 143 in Spain and Luxembourg and 144 in the United Kingdom. Most of Western 
Europe,  in  fact,  has  incarceration  rates  below 100, including Finland (75), Denmark (77), Sweden  
                                                 
12 Total of ten crimes: car theft; theft from car; motor-cycle theft; bicycle theft; burglary; attempted burglary; robbery; 
personal thefts; and assaults or threats. 
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Source: International Centre for Prison Studies (2006) 
 
(78), Switzerland (83), Ireland (85), France (88), Belgium (90), Greece (90), Germany (97), and Italy 
(97) (see Figure 6). 
 
The magnitude of the incarcerated population in the United States is sometimes difficult to 
comprehend. In 2004, U.S. prisons and jails held 2.1 million inmates, about 90 percent of whom 
were men.
13 Given that the adult male workforce age 16 and older in the same year was about 78.7 
million,
14 this implies that a staggering 2.3 percent of the adult male population of the United States 




Based on the evidence reviewed so far, the U.S. economic and social model appears to generate a 
considerable degree of social exclusion, with high levels of income inequality, high relative and even 
absolute poverty rates, poor and unequal educational outcomes, poor and unequal health outcomes, 
and high rates of crime and incarceration. The U.S. model maintains its appeal in the face of poor 
performance in these areas, however, because supporters believe that the United States offers two 
compensating advantages: a flexible economy that yields high employment rates, and high income 
mobility that, in principle, compensates for greater inequality. 
 
As the first column of Table 10 demonstrates, the U.S. experience with overall unemployment (5.6 
percent in 2004) is good, and certainly far better than in Germany (9.9), France (9.6), and Spain 
(11.0). At the same time, several Western European countries, with decidedly less "flexible" labor 
                                                 
13 See, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin, "Prison and Jail 
Inmates at Midyear 2004," April 2005. 
14 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey home page, http://www.bls.gov/cps/home.htm, customized 
tables, series LNS11000001Q, for second quarter 2004, which corresponds most closely to the mid-year 2004 prison 
and jail estimates. 
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markets in the usual sense of that term, had unemployment rates in 2004 that were the same or 
lower than the United States: Ireland (4.4), Switzerland (4.4), Norway (4.5), the Netherlands (4.7), 
the United Kingdom (4.7), Austria (5.3), and Denmark (5.3). 
 
Despite the alleged superiority of U.S.-style flexibility, the United States does not do much better 
he unemployment rate, however, is not the only measure of labor-market performance. The next 
he United States has done well in incorporating women into the paid labor force. But, the data in 
mployment rates for youth (column seven) repeat the now familiar pattern. The United States does 
                                                
when it comes to unemployment rates for typically marginalized groups such as young people and 
those with less education, the kinds of groups most likely to benefit from greater wage flexibility, for 
example. The third column of Table 10 reports the unemployment rate for 15-to-24 year-olds. The 
rate in the United States (11.8 percent) is well below rates in France (21.3), Italy (23.5), and Spain 
(22.0), but above rates in Switzerland (7.7), Denmark (7.8), the Netherlands (8.0), Ireland (8.1), the 
United Kingdom (10.9), Austria (11.0), Germany (11.7), and Norway (11.7). (The unemployment 
rate, and even the employment rate, for youth does not necessarily paint an accurate picture of how 
well the labor-market is performing for young people, since many young people are probably best 
off in school. We will examine this issue below.) The fourth column shows a similar pattern for 
those with the equivalent of less-than-a-high-school education. The U.S. unemployment rate for this 
group (in 2002) was 9.9 percent, higher than the corresponding rates in Norway (3.9), Portugal (5.7), 
Sweden (6.1), Switzerland (6.1), Ireland (6.3), Greece (6.6), United Kingdom (6.9), Denmark (7.2), 
and Austria (7.9).  
 
T
four columns of Table 10 give the employment-to-population rates for different demographic 
groups. Among 15-to-64 year olds, the United States does manage to incorporate more of the 
population into jobs (71.2 percent) than is the case in several major European economies, most 
notably France (62.8), Germany (65.5), Italy (57.4), and Spain (62.0) (see Figure 7). Nevertheless, 
many smaller, "less flexible" Western European economies have higher employment rates than the 
United States: the United Kingdom (72.7), the Netherlands (73.1), Sweden (73.5), Norway (75.6), 




column six show that many Western European countries have also succeeded in this respect. In 
2004, 65.4 percent of U.S. women ages 15-to-64 were employed. This was substantially higher than 
the corresponding rates in Italy (45.2), Spain (49.0), France (56.9), and Germany (59.9). The U.S. 
rates, however, are not as high as those in many European economies: Finland (65.5), the 
Netherlands (65.7), the United Kingdom (66.6), Switzerland (70.3), Sweden (71.8), Denmark (72.0), 
and Norway (72.7). 
 
E
better than the large, high-unemployment economies, but not as well as a host of smaller European 
economies. For youth, employment rates in the United States were 53.9 percent in 2004, well above 
the rates in Italy (27.2), France (29.5), Spain (38.4), and Germany (41.9), but not as high as rates in 
Norway (54.4), the United Kingdom (60.1), Denmark (61.3), Switzerland (62.0), and the Netherlands 
(66.2). 
 
15 Schmitt and Baker (2006) find that the declining coverage rate of the Current Population Survey (CPS) in recent 
decades may lead the CPS, which is the source of the U.S. unemployment and employment rate figures cited here, to 
overstate employment in the United States by about 1.4 percentage points, with the largest biases for more 
marginalized groups, especially young black men and young Hispanic women. To the extent that European surveys do 
not suffer from similar problems, the comparison here would overstate the U.S. performance relative to Europe. 
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With respect to employment rates for the less-educated, the United States actually underperforms 
when compared with much of Western Europe. In 2003, 58 percent of the less-educated population 
in the United States was in work. This rate was near or below rates in Ireland (57), Spain (57), 
Finland (58), Greece (58), France (59), Denmark (61), Norway (62), Switzerland (66), Sweden (68), 
and Portugal (72). 
 
Earlier, we mentioned that using the unemployment rate (and even the employment rate) to measure 
social exclusion among youth may be misleading. From a societal perspective, we may be just as 
concerned about whether young people are in school as we are about whether they are in work. The 
last three columns of Table 10, therefore, report OECD data for 2002 on the share of young people 
in each country that were neither in work nor in employment. The United States does not do 
particularly well among either 15-to-19 year olds or 20-to-24 year olds. For the younger group, only 
Hungary (8.0), the United Kingdom (8.6), Italy (10.5), and Finland (14.8 percent) had a higher share 
of young people out of both work and school (the U.S. rate was 7.5 percent). For the next-older age 
group, the United States (15.6) does better than some Western European economies – Germany 
(15.9), Belgium (17.4), Finland (18.8), Greece (22.0), and Italy (24.3) – but not as well as Denmark 
(7.3), the Netherlands (7.9), Norway (9.7), Switzerland (9.7), Ireland (10.8), Sweden (11.2), Austria 
(11.7), Portugal (12.0), France (14.4), Spain (15.1), and the United Kingdom (15.3). 
 
The review of these data suggests that U.S. labor-market performance is generally – though not 
always – better than that of the four, large, high-unemployment European economies (France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain). Nevertheless, the United States consistently underperforms relative to 
many of the smaller Western European economies whose labor markets are conventionally seen as 
much more rigid than those of the United States. 
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Economic Mobility 
 
Advocates of the U.S. model also maintain that the country's economic dynamism produces a level 
of economic mobility that compensates for high levels of inequality and poverty. Economic and 
social distances may be much greater in the United States than they are in Europe, but, the argument 
goes, those at the bottom have a much greater chance to get ahead than they do in Europe. In this 
final section, we briefly review some international evidence on economic mobility both within and 
across generations. 
 
Table 11 and Figure 8 present OECD data on short-term income mobility for a subsample of 14 
countries. The table gives the share of low-income families (where low-income was defined as 
earning less than half of the national median income) that managed to escape from low-income 
status over a three-year period in the mid-1990s.
16 Contrary to the view that the United States offers 
substantial mobility, the United States has the lowest share of low-income workers that exit their 
low-income status from one year to the next (29.5 percent). The corresponding rates in several 
European countries are greater than 50 percent: Ireland (54.6), the Netherlands (55.7), the United 
Kingdom (58.8), and Denmark (60.4). 
 
Table 12 summarizes the results from three separate studies of longer-term intergenerational 
mobility across countries. In all three cases, the studies investigated the degree of correlation 
between fathers' and sons' incomes at different points in time. These intergenerational income 
coefficients quantify the economic advantage conferred by parents to their children: the higher the 
coefficient, the more likely that children born to poor parents are to remain poor later in life. 
 
Panel (a) summarizes Blanden's (2004) findings for Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. Blanden found the lowest level of correlation between fathers’ and sons’ incomes – 
therefore, the highest degree of economic mobility-- in Germany (0.12), followed by Canada (0.18) 
and the United Kingdom (0.27). Intergenerational economic mobility was lowest, by a substantial 
margin, in the United States (0.45).  
 
Panel (b) presents similar correlation coefficients from a review of international studies by Solon 
(1992).
17 The 0.40 coefficient for the United States is Solon's estimated average based on research in 
the United States. According to these data, only South Africa (0.44) and, in one of two studies, the 
United Kingdom (0.57), had lower rates of mobility than the United States (0.40) did. Canada (0.23), 
Finland (0.13 and 0.22), Germany (0.11 and 0.34), and Sweden (0.13, 0.14, and 0.28) all appear to 
have substantially greater economic mobility across generations than the United States does. 
                                                 
16 The data for the United States refer to 1987-1989. The OECD notes that: "The time periods used to study poverty 
dynamics in the different countries are not fully comparable. The most important instance of non-comparable time 
periods is that poverty dynamics for the United States are studied for an earlier period ... than that studied for the 
other countries, due to data consistency problems in the American data for more recent years. Although the periods 
chosen are those for which business cycle conditions in the United States approximated those in the other countries 
studied, this difference means that the results do not reflect the impact on American poverty dynamics of recent 
reforms in welfare programmes and more generous in-work benefits (i.e. expansion of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit). On the other hand, the PSID data for income years after 1992 show greater poverty incidence and 
persistence in the United States, so that the use of these data would reinforce the comparative results for the United 
States. Exclusion of these data can be regarded as representing a somewhat conservative approach to the 
assessment of American poverty." 
17 Some countries have more than one study. 
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FIGURE 8. Income mobility, late 1980s-mid 1990s (percent of low-income families exiting 



































Corak's (2004) review (see panel (c)) reaches similar conclusions. The United Kingdom (0.50) and 
the United States (0.47) have the least economic mobility. France (0.41), Germany (0.32), Sweden 
(0.27), Canada (0.19), Finland (0.18), Norway (0.17), and Denmark (0.15) all offer greater economic 
mobility than the United States. 
 
What appear to be small differences in intergenerational income coefficients actually imply 
substantial differences in economic mobility. Take, for example, the case of a family with earnings 
that are half of the national average. Other factors held constant, if a country has a correlation 
coefficient for parent-child earnings of 0.20, we would expect that descendants of the poor family 
would reach the average national earnings in less than two generations, or about 25 to 50 years.
18 In 
countries with a coefficient of 0.45, a typical level in the estimates for the United States (and, in 
some cases, for the United Kingdom), however, descendants of the poor family would not, on 
average, close the income gap with the average family for more than three generations, or about 75 
to 100 years.  
                                                 
18 Intergenerational mobility coefficients are determined by the regression: ln Yi,t = α + βln Yi,t-1 + εi,t, where generations 
are indexed by t. If Gt = Y1,t/Y2,t and non-parental income influences are ignored (ε = 0), the income gaps between 
two sets of parents, G0, and their respective children, G1, satisfy G1 = G0β. Similarly, Gn = G0β^n, which implies that n 
= ln (ln Gn/ln G0)/ln β. The calculations above assume G0 = 2 (the 200 percent gap between the mean and half the 
mean), Gn=1.05 (only a five percent gap) , and a generation equals 25 years. 
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Conclusion 
 
The U.S. economic and social model is associated with substantial levels of social exclusion, 
including high levels of income inequality, high relative and absolute poverty rates, poor and unequal 
educational outcomes, poor health outcomes, and high rates of crime and incarceration.  
 
At the same time, the available evidence provides little support for the view that U.S.-style labor-
market flexibility dramatically improves labor-market outcomes. The U.S. labor market appears to 
fare consistently better than the four large, high-unemployment economies in Europe – France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain – but the U.S. does no better and often noticeably worse than many 
smaller European economies that have labor markets that are highly regulated relative to the United 
States and even relative to the labor markets in the large, high-unemployment countries.  
 
The data also appear to contradict the belief that greater economic mobility in the United States can 
somehow compensate for greater levels of inequality and "social exclusion." Despite popular 
prejudices to the contrary, the U.S. economy consistently affords a lower level of economic mobility, 
both in the short-term (from one year to the next) and in the longer-term (across generations), than 
all the continental European countries for which data are available. Given the high direct levels of 
social exclusion in the United States and especially the low levels of economic mobility across 
generations, the United States, therefore, stands as a poor model for a Europe seeking to combat 
social exclusion. 
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Tables 
TABLE 1
Household income inequality, late 1990s-2000
10th percentile 90th percentile Ratio Gini
90th to 10th coefficient
Australia 45 195 4.33 0.31
Austria 53 178 3.37 0.27
Belgium 53 170 3.19 0.25
Canada 46 188 4.13 0.31
Czech Republic 60 179 3.01 0.26
Denmark 54 155 2.85 0.24
Finland 57 164 2.90 0.25
France 54 191 3.54 0.29
Germany 54 173 3.18 0.25
Greece -- -- -- --
Hungary 54 194 3.57 0.30
I c e l a n d - -- -- --
Ireland 46 201 4.33 0.33
Italy 44 199 4.48 0.33
Japan 46 192 4.17 0.32
Luxembourg 66 215 3.24 0.26
Mexico 28 328 11.55 0.49
Netherlands 56 167 2.98 0.25
N e w  Z e a l a n d - -- -- --
Norway 57 159 2.80 0.25
Poland 52 188 3.59 0.29
P o r t u g a l - -- -- --
Slovak Republic 56 162 2.88 0.24
Spain 50 197 3.96 0.30
Sweden 57 168 2.96 0.25
Switzerland 52 188 3.62 0.31
United Kingdom 47 215 4.58 0.35
United States 39 210 5.45 0.37
Notes: Timothy M. Smeeding, "Public Policy and Economic Inequality:
The United States in Comparative Perspective," Luxembourg Income Study
Working Paper Series No. 367, February 2004, Figure 1. Data for Japan and 
Switzerland refer to 1992.









Relative rate Absolute rate Year
Australia 6.6 16.4 1994
Austria 4.0 6.3 1997
Belgium 3.2 7.2 1997
Canada 6.5 6.5 2000
Czech Republic -- -- --
Denmark 4.9 7.3 1994
Finland 2.1 6.8 2000
France 3.3 10.0 1994
Germany 4.2 7.0 2000
Greece -- -- --
Hungary -- -- --
Iceland -- -- --
Ireland 8.0 15.4 2000
Italy 7.3 18.8 2000
J a p a n - -- --
Luxembourg -- -- --
Mexico -- -- --
Netherlands 4.5 7.4 1999
New Zealand -- -- --
Norway 2.8 2.6 2000
Poland -- -- --
P o r t u g a l - -- --
Slovak Republic -- -- --
Spain 5.2 -- 1990
Sweden 3.6 7.9 2000
Switzerland 4.0 3.5 1992
United Kingdom 5.4 11.8 1999
United States 10.7 8.7 2000
Notes: Lyle Scruggs and James P. Allan, "The Material Consequences of Welfare
States: Benefit Generosity and Absolute Poverty in 16 OECD Countries," Luxembourg
Income Study Working Paper Series No. 409, April 2005, Table 1. Relative 
poverty is less than 40 percent of median adjusted disposable income. Absolute 
poverty is less than 40 percent of US median income in 1986 adjusted for inflation
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TABLE 3
Educational attainment by age, 2003
(percent)
25-64 25-34  25-64 25-34 
Australia 62 75 31 36
Austria 79 85 15 15
Belgium 62 78 29 39
Canada 84 90 44 53
Czech Republic  86 92 12 12
Denmark 81 86 32 35
Finland 76 89 33 40
France 65 80 23 37
Germany 83 85 24 22
Greece 51 72 18 24
Hungary 74 83 15 17
Iceland 59 64 26 29
Ireland 62 78 26 37
Italy 44 60 10 12
Japan 84 94 37 52
Luxembourg 59 68 15 19
Mexico 21 25 15 19
Netherlands 66 76 24 28
New Zealand  78 84 31 32
Norway 87 95 31 40
Poland 48 57 14 20
Portugal 23 37 11 16
Slovak Republic 87 94 12 13
Spain 43 60 25 38
Sweden 82 91 33 40
Switzerland 70 76 27 29
United Kingdom 65 71 28 33
United States  88 87 38 39
Notes: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2005, web edition, Tables A1.2a and A1.3a.
At least upper secondary education At least tertiary educationIs the U.S. a Good Model for Reducing Social Exclusion in Europe?    20 
 
TABLE 4
Variation in mathematics performance among 15-year-olds, 2003
(percent)
10th percentile Mean 90th percentile
Australia 399 524 645
Austria 384 506 626
Belgium 381 529 664
Canada 419 532 644
Czech Republic  392 516 641
Denmark 396 514 632
Finland 438 544 652
France 389 511 628
Germany 363 503 632
Greece 324 445 566
Hungary 370 490 611
Iceland 396 515 629
Ireland 393 503 614
Italy 342 466 589
Japan 402 534 660
Luxembourg 373 493 611
Mexico 276 385 497
Netherlands 415 538 657
New Zealand  394 523 650
Norway 376 495 614
Poland 376 490 607
Portugal 352 466 580
Slovak Republic 379 498 619
Spain 369 485 597
Sweden 387 509 630
Switzerland 396 527 652
United Kingdom -- -- --
United States  356 483 607
Notes: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2005, web edition, Table A4.3. Entries 
are scores in OECD PISA mathematics scale.
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TABLE 5
Average annual educational expenditures per student, 2002
(US dollars at purchasing power parity exchange rates)
Pre-primary Primary Secondary Tertiary Total
Australia -- 5,169 7,375 12,416 7,209
Austria 6,169 7,015 8,887 12,448 8,943
Belgium 4,420 5,665 8,272 12,019 7,933
Canada -- -- -- -- --
Czech Republic  2,724 2,077 3,628 6,236 3,449
Denmark 4,673 7,727 8,003 15,183 9,261
Finland 3,929 5,087 7,121 11,768 7,304
France 4,512 5,033 8,472 9,276 7,467
Germany 4,999 4,537 7,025 10,999 7,129
Greece -- 3,803 4,058 4,731 4,136
Hungary 3,475 3,016 3,184 8,205 3,872
Iceland -- 7,171 7,229 8,251 7,548
Ireland -- 4,180 5,725 9,809 5,711
Italy 5,445 7,231 7,568 8,636 7,708
Japan 3,691 6,117 6,952 11,716 7,438
Luxembourg -- 10,611 15,195 -- --
Mexico 1,643 1,467 1,768 6,074 1,950
Netherlands 4,923 5,558 6,823 13,101 7,241
New Zealand  4,650 4,536 5,698 -- --
Norway -- 7,508 10,154 13,739 9,560
Poland 2,691 2,585 -- 4,834 2,962
Portugal 4,158 4,940 6,921 6,960 6,080
Slovak Republic 2,125 1,471 2,193 4,756 2,300
Spain 3,845 4,592 6,010 8,020 5,914
Sweden 4,107 7,143 7,400 15,715 8,520
Switzerland 3,450 7,776 11,900 23,714 11,334
United Kingdom 8,452 5,150 6,505 11,822 6,691
United States  7,881 8,049 9,098 20,545 11,152
Notes: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2005, web edition, Table B1.1. Expenditures for non-tertiary 
post-secondary education not shown, but included in total.Is the U.S. a Good Model for Reducing Social Exclusion in Europe?    22 
 
TABLE 6
Average annual educational expenditures as share of GDP, 2002
(percent)
Public Private Total Public Private Total Public Private Total
Australia 3.6 0.7 4.2 0.8 0.8 1.6 4.4 1.5 5.9
Austria 3.7 0.1 3.8 1.1 -- 1.1 4.8 0.1 4.9
Belgium 4.1 0.2 4.3 1.2 0.1 1.4 5.3 0.3 5.6
Canada -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Czech Republic  2.8 0.1 2.9 0.8 0.1 0.9 3.6 0.2 3.8
Denmark 4.1 0.1 4.2 1.9 -- 1.9 6.0 0.1 6.1
Finland 3.8 -- 3.9 1.7 -- 1.8 5.5 -- 5.6
France 4.0 0.2 4.2 1.0 0.1 1.1 5.0 0.4 5.3
Germany 3.0 0.7 3.6 1.0 0.1 1.1 3.9 0.8 4.7
Greece 2.5 0.2 2.7 1.2 -- 1.2 3.7 0.2 3.9
Hungary 3.1 0.2 3.3 1.0 0.3 1.2 4.1 0.5 4.5
Iceland 5.4 0.3 5.7 1.0 -- 1.1 6.5 0.3 6.8
Ireland 3.0 0.1 3.1 1.1 0.2 1.3 4.0 0.3 4.3
Italy 3.4 0.1 3.5 0.8 0.2 0.9 4.2 0.3 4.5
Japan 2.7 0.2 3.0 0.4 0.6 1.1 3.2 0.9 4.0
Luxembourg 3.9 -- 3.9 -- -- -- 3.9 -- 3.9
Mexico 3.5 0.7 4.1 1.0 0.4 1.4 4.5 1.1 5.5
Netherlands 3.3 0.2 3.4 1.0 0.3 1.3 4.3 0.4 4.7
New Zealand  4.4 0.5 4.9 0.9 0.6 1.5 5.3 1.1 6.3
Norway 4.2 -- 4.3 1.4 0.1 1.5 5.6 0.1 5.7
Poland 4.0 0.1 4.1 1.1 0.5 1.5 5.0 0.6 5.6
Portugal 4.2 -- 4.2 0.9 0.1 1.0 5.2 0.1 5.2
Slovak Republic 2.7 0.1 2.8 0.7 0.1 0.9 3.5 0.2 3.6
Spain 2.9 0.2 3.2 1.0 0.3 1.2 3.9 0.5 4.4
Sweden 4.6 -- 4.6 1.6 0.2 1.8 6.2 0.2 6.3
Switzerland 4.0 0.6 4.6 1.4 -- 1.4 5.4 0.6 4.6
United Kingdom 3.7 0.6 4.3 0.8 0.3 1.1 4.5 0.9 5.4
United States  3.8 0.3 4.1 1.2 1.4 2.6 5.0 1.8 6.7
Notes: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2005, web edition, Table B2.1b. 
Primary and secondary Tertiary TotalIs the U.S. a Good Model for Reducing Social Exclusion in Europe?    23 
 
TABLE 7
Average annual health-care expenditures, 2003
(percent)
Public Private Total Public Private Total
Australia 6.3 3.0 9.3 1,822 877 2,699
Austria 5.1 2.4 7.5 1,556 746 2,302
Belgium 9.6 0.0 9.6 2,827 0.0 2,827
Canada 6.9 3.0 9.9 2,098 903 3,001
Czech Republic  6.8 0.7 7.5 1,169 129 1,298
Denmark 7.5 1.5 9.0 2,293 470 2,763
Finland 5.7 1.7 7.4 1,620 498 2,118
France 7.7 2.4 10.1 2,215 688 2,903
Germany 8.7 2.4 11.1 2,343 653 2,996
Greece 5.1 4.8 9.9 1,032 979 2,011
Hungary 6.1 2.3 8.4 919 350 1,269
Iceland 8.8 1.7 10.5 2,601 514 3,115
Ireland 5.8 1.6 7.4 1,912 539 2,451
Italy 6.3 2.1 8.4 1,696 562 2,258
Japan 6.4 1.5 7.9 1,743 396 2,139
Luxembourg 6.2 0.7 6.9 3,331 374 3,705
Mexico 2.9 3.3 6.2 271 312 583
Netherlands 6.1 3.7 9.8 1,857 1,119 2,976
New Zealand  6.4 1.7 8.1 1,484 402 1,886
Norway 8.6 1.7 10.3 3,186 621 3,807
Poland 4.5 2.0 6.5 520 224 744
Portugal 6.7 2.9 9.6 1,253 544 1,797
Slovak Republic 5.2 0.7 5.9 686 91 777
Spain 5.5 2.2 7.7 1,307 528 1,835
Sweden 8.0 1.4 9.4 2,303 400 2,703
Switzerland 6.7 4.8 11.5 2,212 1,569 3,781
United Kingdom 6.4 1.3 7.7 1,861 370 2,231
United States  6.7 8.3 15.0 2,502 3,133 5,635
As a share of GDP US dollars, PPP
Notes: Authors' calculations based on OECD, OECD Health Data 2005,  web edition. US dollars at 
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates.
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TABLE 8
Various health outcomes, circa 2003
Infant mortality Maternal mor- Obesity Smoking
(deaths per tality (deaths per  (percent adults  (percent adults 
Female Male All 1,000 live births) 100,000 births) BMI>30) smoking daily)
Australia 82.8 77.8 80.3 4.8 4.7 21.7 19.8
Austria 81.6 75.6 78.6 4.5 3.6 9.1 36.3
Belgium 81.1 75.1 78.1 4.3 7.8 11.7 27.0
Canada 82.1 77.2 79.7 5.4 4.4 14.3 17.0
Czech Republic  78.5 72.0 75.3 3.9 7.7 14.8 24.1
Denmark 79.5 74.9 77.2 4.4 11.1 9.5 28.0
Finland 81.8 75.1 78.5 3.1 6.3 12.8 22.2
France 82.9 75.8 79.4 3.9 8.0 9.4 27.0
Germany 81.3 75.5 78.4 4.2 4.3 12.9 24.3
Greece 80.7 75.4 78.1 4.8 3.9 21.9 35.0
Hungary 76.5 68.3 72.4 7.3 7.1 18.8 33.8
Iceland 82.4 79.0 80.7 2.4 9.7 12.4 22.4
Ireland 80.3 75.2 77.8 5.1 3.1 13.0 27.0
Italy 82.9 76.9 79.9 4.3 3.1 8.5 24.2
Japan 85.3 78.4 81.8 3.0 6.5 3.2 30.3
Luxembourg 81.5 74.9 78.2 4.9 10.9 18.4 33.0
Mexico 77.4 72.4 74.9 20.1 70.7 24.2 26.4
Netherlands 80.9 76.2 78.6 4.8 6.9 10.0 32.0
New Zealand  81.1 76.3 78.7 5.6 6.6 20.9 25.0
Norway 81.9 77.0 79.5 3.4 6.6 8.3 26.0
Poland 78.9 70.5 74.7 7.0 5.6 -- 27.6
Portugal 80.6 74.0 77.3 4.1 5.4 12.8 20.5
Slovak Republic 77.8 69.9 73.9 7.9 7.0 22.4 24.3
Spain 83.7 77.2 80.5 4.1 4.2 13.1 28.1
Sweden 82.4 77.9 80.2 3.1 4.2 9.7 17.5
Switzerland 83.0 77.8 80.4 4.3 5.0 7.7 26.8
United Kingdom 80.7 76.2 78.5 5.3 6.5 23.0 26.0
United States  79.9 74.5 77.2 7.0 9.1 30.6 17.5
Notes: OECD, OECD Health Data 2005, web edition. Maternal mortality are averages for five most recent years. BMI is body mass index.
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TABLE 9
Crime and punishment, 2000s
Crime
victimization
Murder rate (offences  Rate World
(per 100,000) per 100) (per 100,000) rank
Australia 1.9 54.3 126 60
Austria 1.2 31.4 108 173
Belgium 1.8 33.3 90 138
Canada 1.8 40.4 107 129
Czech Republic 2.5 -- 191 156
Denmark 1.0 35.1 77 60
Finland 2.9 28.6 75 122
France 1.7 33.9 88 129
Germany 1.2 -- 97 145
Greece 1.4 -- 90 80
Hungary 2.3 -- 163 107
Iceland -- -- 39 103
Ireland 1.4 -- 85 142
Italy 1.5 -- 97 198
Japan 1.1 21.0 62 119
Luxembourg -- -- 143 63
Mexico -- -- 191 146
Netherlands 1.5 48.1 127 102
New Zealand 2.5 -- 189 93
Norway 1.0 -- 68 138
Poland 2.1 39.7 229 92
Portugal 1.2 25.8 123 93
Slovak Republic 2.6 -- 169 75
Spain 1.1 -- 143 168
Sweden 1.1 45.6 78 157
Switzerland 1.1 42.6 83 160
United Kingdom 1.6 54.5 144 48
United States 5.6 39.5 724 1
Prison population rate
Notes: Gordon Barclay and Cynthia Tavares, "International comparisons of criminal justice statistics 
2001,"United Kingdom Home Office, Research Development and Statistics Directorate, October 24, 
2001, Table 1.1. Murders recorded by the police. United Kingdom refers to England and Wales.  
International Centre for Prison Studies, King's College, London, http://www.prisonstudies.org/. United 
Kingdom refers to England and Wales. Ireland excludes N. Ireland. Ranking out of 213 countries and 
regions. J.N. van Kesteren, P. Mayhew, and P. Nieuwbeerta, "Criminal Victimization in Seventeen 
Industrial Countries: Key Findings from the 2000 International Crime Victims Survey," The Hague: 
Ministry of Justice, Appendix 4, Table 2. Total of ten crimes: car theft; theft from car; motor-cycle 
theft; bicycle theft; burglary; attempted burglary; robbery; personal thefts; and assaults or threats. 





All Women Youth Less-educ. All Women Youth Less-educ. Ages Ages Ages
15-64 15-64 15-24 25-64 15-64 15-64 15-24 25-64 15-19 20-24 25-29
Australia 5.5 5.6 11.7 7.0 69.5 62.6 59.4 61 7.0 13.2 17.8
Austria 5.3 5.3 11.0 7.9 66.5 60.1 49.9 55 6.3 11.7 12.4
Belgium 7.4 8.3 17.5 10.7 60.5 53.0 28.1 49 6.8 17.4 17.2
Canada 7.2 6.9 13.4 10.9 72.6 68.4 58.1 57 6.5 14.0 16.7
Czech Republic 8.4 10.0 20.4 19.8 64.2 56.0 28.5 44 6.0 18.1 23.8
Denmark 5.3 5.5 7.8 7.2 76.0 72.0 61.3 61 2.4 7.3 6.7
Finland 8.9 9.0 20.8 11.1 67.2 65.5 38.1 58 14.8 18.8 19.7
France 9.6 10.7 21.3 12.1 62.8 56.9 29.5 59 3.4 14.4 18.2
Germany 9.9 9.4 11.7 18.0 65.5 59.9 41.9 50 4.7 15.9 17.4
Greece 10.4 16.0 26.5 6.6 59.6 45.5 27.4 58 6.2 22.0 25.2
Hungary 6.1 6.1 15.5 10.6 56.8 50.7 23.6 37 8.0 20.3 27.6
Iceland 3.1 3.0 8.1 -- 82.8 79.4 66.3 -- -- -- --
Ireland 4.4 3.7 8.1 6.3 65.5 55.8 44.8 57 4.8 10.8 14.7
Italy 8.1 10.6 23.5 -- 57.4 45.2 27.2 -- 10.5 24.3 24.8
Japan 4.9 4.7 9.5 6.7 68.7 57.4 40.0 67 0.0 0.0 0.0
Luxembourg 4.8 6.9 18.3 3.3 61.6 50.6 21.4 61 3.0 7.0 11.6
Mexico 3.1 3.5 6.4 1.6 60.8 41.3 45.2 63 17.5 26.6 30.6
Netherlands 4.7 5.0 8.0 -- 73.1 65.7 66.2 -- 4.6 7.9 12.9
New Zealand 4.0 4.5 9.3 4.9 75.6 66.5 56.8 63 -- -- --
Norway 4.5 3.9 11.7 3.9 73.5 72.7 54.4 62 3.2 9.7 10.7
Poland 19.3 20.2 40.8 25.9 51.9 46.4 20.0 38 3.1 25.4 31.8
Portugal 7.0 8.0 15.3 5.7 67.8 61.7 36.9 72 7.3 12.0 12.2
Slovak Republic 18.2 19.1 32.7 44.9 57.0 50.9 26.5 29 15.6 33.9 30.5
Spain 11.0 15.1 22.0 11.2 62.0 49.0 38.4 57 7.2 15.1 19.8
Sweden 6.6 6.2 17.0 6.1 73.5 71.8 42.8 68 4.6 11.2 8.1
Switzerland 4.4 4.8 7.7 6.1 77.4 70.3 62.0 66 4.4 9.7 12.6
United Kingdom 4.7 4.3 10.9 6.9 72.7 66.6 60.1 54 8.6 15.3 16.0
United States 5.6 5.5 11.8 9.9 71.2 65.4 53.9 58 7.5 15.6 17.7
Standardized unemployment rate Employment-to-population rate Not in education and not employed
Notes: OECD, Employment Outlook 2004, 2005, various tables. Data for less-educated refer to 2003. Data for individuals not in education or employment refer to 

































Notes: OECD, OECD Employment Outlook 2001, Table 2.2.
Low-income defined as earning less than half of the national median
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Notes: (a) Jo Blanden, "International Evidence on Inter-
generational Mobility," Centre for Economic Performance,
January 2004, Table 3. (b) Gary Solon, "Cross-Country
Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol 16, no. 3, Summer
2002, pp. 59-66, Table 1 and text. © Miles Corak, “Do poor
children become poor adults?” unpublished paper, 2004.
 
 